The hash function Blue Midnight Wish (BMW) is a candidate in the SHA-3 competition organised by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). BMW was selected for the second round of the competition, but the algorithm was tweaked in a number of ways. In this paper we describe cryptanalysis on the original version of BMW, as submitted to the SHA-3 competition in October 2008. When we refer to BMW, we therefore mean the original version of the algorithm.
Introduction
On October 31, 2008, the "SHA-3 competition", organised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), was launched [5] . 64 algorithms were submitted, and 51 of these were accepted for the first round of the competition. On July 24, 2009, 14 candidates were chosen by NIST to advance to the second round of the competition.
One of the candidates accepted for the second round is called Blue Midnight Wish [3] , or BMW for short, and was developed by Gligoroski, Klíma, Knapskog, El-Hadedy, Amundsen, and Mjølsnes. On a standard PC, BMW is arguably the most efficient of the 14 hash functions remaining in the competition [1] . Blue Midnight Wish was tweaked for the second round of the competition. In this paper, we always refer to the original version of the hash function, i.e., the version submitted to the competition on (or before) October 31, 2008.
In this paper we describe some weaknesses in Blue Midnight Wish. We show how to easily find near-collisions in the compression function of Blue Midnight Wish. By nearcollisions we mean a pair of inputs to the compression function for which the outputs only differ in a few (pre-specified) bit positions.
We also show how to find collisions, preimages, and second preimages in the compression function, faster than what is possible for an ideal compression function. This can be done by controlling 128, respectively 256 bits of the output of the compression function of BMW-256, respectively BMW-512. By controlling we mean that the adversary can give these bits any value he wishes with negligible effort. These attacks on the compression function can be extended to become pseudo-attacks on the full hash function, i.e., attacks which allow the adversary to pick the initial value of the hash function. The complexity of these attacks corresponds to the complexity of a 192-bit, respectively 384-bit ideal hash function in the case of BMW-256, respectively BMW-512. Hence, for instance, pseudo-collisions can be found in BMW-512 in time about 2 192 , which is to be compared to the expected 2 256 for an ideal 512-bit hash function. Memory requirements of all attacks are negligible.
We point out that the attacks described in this paper do not seem to apply to the tweaked version of Blue Midnight Wish. We are making these results public in the hope that they will somehow be useful to other cryptanalysts.
Organisation of the Paper
We explain the notation used throughout the paper in the next subsection. Then, in Section 2 we describe how the Blue Midnight Wish hash functions work. In Section 3 we describe the near-collision attack on the compression function. In Section 4, we describe a more general pseudo-attack, which may be used in pseudo-collision, -preimage, and -second preimage attacks, and we give some concrete examples. In Section 5 we conclude.
Notation
The symbol '⊕' denotes exclusive-or (XOR). x s means x shifted left bitwise by s positions; similarly, x s means x shifted right by s positions. By x ≪s we mean x rotated (cyclically shifted) left by s positions. The expression x y denotes the concatenation of the two bit strings x and y, and we denote the bitlength of x by |x|.
A Description of Blue Midnight Wish
Blue Midnight Wish is in fact a collection of four hash functions returning digests of four different sizes: 224 bits, 256 bits, 384 bits, and 512 bits. The two shortest digests are computed in the same way, except in the final step, which is a truncation. Likewise for the two longest digests. The word size, denoted by w, for the short variants is 32 bits, and for the long variants is 64 bits. Apart from the word size, all four variants are very similar. A little-endian byte ordering is assumed.
Blue Midnight Wish applies only four different types of operations: additions modulo 2 w , exclusive-ors (XORs), and bitwise shifts and rotations. In the following, all additions of words in the description of Blue Midnight Wish are to be taken modulo 2 w .
Blue Midnight Wish maintains a state of 16 words during the processing of a message; only in the end, the 16 words are truncated down to 6, 7, or 8, depending on the digest size (truncation is done by throwing away the first 10, 9, or 8 words, respectively). Message blocks are also 16 words in length, and Blue Midnight Wish operates with a compression function mapping 2 × 16 words to 16 words. The compression function is iterated in a standard fashion [2, 4] . Hence, the message m of bitlength µ = |m| must be padded to a length that is a multiple of 16w bits, which is done by first appending a '1'-bit, then appending z = −µ − 65 mod 16w '0'-bits (this part of the padding will be called "10. . . " padding in the following), and finally appending a 64-bit representation of the message length µ (length padding).
We now turn to a description of the Blue Midnight Wish compression function.
The Blue Midnight Wish Compression Function
The Blue Midnight Wish compression function takes two 16-word inputs and returns a single 16-word output. It applies three different sub-functions, which are called P , f 1 , and f 2 . P is an efficiently invertible permutation 1 . f 1 is a so-called multi-permutation taking two inputs, meaning that by fixing one of the inputs, the function is a permutation on the other input. Finally, f 2 compresses three inputs of 16 words to a single 16-word output, which is also the output of the compression function. The two 16-word inputs to the compression function will be called H and M , H being the chaining variable, and M being the message block. Referring to a single word in one of the inputs will be denoted by H i or M i , meaning word number i, where counting starts from 0. Hence, (e.g.
The input to the permutation
The inputs to f 2 are Y , Z, and M , and the output, which is also the output of the compression function, is denoted H * . See also Figure 1 .
The Blue Midnight Wish compression function. Given Y and M , H can easily be computed as P −1 (Y ) ⊕ M , since P is efficiently invertible. Moreover, H is not used as input to any other sub-function than P . Hence, in attacks on the compression function, the details of P are irrelevant, and therefore we postpone a description of these to Appendix A. We now describe the two other components of the compression function.
As mentioned, the inputs to f 1 are M and Y , and the output is denoted Z. Let Q = Y Z be a 32-word vector, and note that when f 1 is called, Q contains 16 already computed words, and 16 "null" words. Then, f 1 can be described as a shift register, that computes one word of Q at the time as a function of the previous 16 words of Q.
There are two variants of the step function that computes each new word of Q: a simple step function, and a more complex one. Since 16 words are computed in f 1 , there are always 16 rounds, but the number of complex and simple rounds depends on a tunable security parameter. By default, there are first two complex rounds and then 14 simple rounds, and we shall generally assume that this is the distribution of complex and simple rounds. However, all our attacks apply to BMW using any value of the security parameter (in the case of the near-collision attack, some modifications are required).
Both complex and simple rounds use a number of invertible sub-functions s 0 , . . . , s 5 and r 1 , . . . , r 7 , whose descriptions are postponed to Appendix B. Both types of rounds also use the same "message schedule": consider M to be a 16-element column vector in Z 2 w , and define the matrix B as the circulant matrix whose first row contains the 16 elements Row i + 1 of B is row i cyclically shifted one position to the right. Note that B is invertible for both word sizes 32 and 64; the inverses can be found in Appendix C. Define W = B · M mod 2 w , with W i referring to the ith word of W . In round i of f 1 , W i is involved in the computation of Z i = Q i+16 . Furthermore, 16 constants K i are defined as 2 w /3 · i. We can now describe a complex round as
for increasing i; for the default choice of the tunable security parameter, i increases from 0 to 1. A simple round, covering the range of remaining values of i up to and including 15, is described as
Note that given M and 16 consecutive words of Q, the remaining 16 words of Q can be computed; in particular, given M and Z, Y can be computed. Likewise, given Y and
The sub-function f 2 takes as input M , Y , and Z. Let
The output words H * 0 , . . . , H * 15 are computed as follows.
Near-collisions in the Compression Function
Attacks on the compression function of Blue Midnight Wish are not affected by the permutation P , since this permutation can be inverted, and thereby the chaining input can be computed. One may also observe that by choosing the same (XOR) differences in H and M , there is no input difference in P , and therefore also no output difference. By ensuring that only the last few words of the expanded message W contain a difference, we see that no difference is involved in a large part of f 1 . Combined with the fact that diffusion is not very effective in f 2 , this observation leads to near-collisions in the compression function.
Hence, a strategy to find the best (lowest weight) near-collision in the compression function is to search for difference patterns of the last few words of W , such that these differences do not spread too much in the last few rounds of f 1 and in f 2 . Note that the inverse message schedule must be applied to W in order to be able to compute f 2 , and this message schedule will cause some diffusion of differences in W ; however, differences in the most significant bits (MSBs) will remain in the MSB positions after the inverse message schedule is applied. Therefore, an obvious choice is to search for difference patterns in W that only affect the MSBs of words of W .
An Example
In the case of both BMW-256 and BMW-512, the search mentioned showed that a good difference pattern in W has differences in the MSBs of W 13 , W 14 , and W 15 only. The inverse message schedule causes differences in the MSBs of M 0 , M 1 , M 3 , M 4 , M 7 , M 9 , and M 13 . Hence, there are 7 bit differences in M , which are introduced in the function f 2 . A difference in W 13 is propagated directly to Z 13 in the 13th round of f 1 . Hence, Z 13 obtains the difference 100 . . . 0 (in binary). In round 14, the function s 4 is applied to Z 13 yielding the difference 1100 . . . 0 (see Appendix B), and a difference in the MSB of W 14 is also introduced. The end result is the difference 0100 . . . 0 in Z 14 with probability 1/2. Finally, in round 15, the function s 5 is applied to Z 13 yielding the difference 10100 . . . 0, the function s 4 is applied to Z 14 yielding the difference 01100 . . . 0, and a difference in the MSB of W 15 is also introduced. Optimally, these differences result in the difference 1100 . . . 0 in Z 15 , since then ∆Z 13 ⊕ ∆Z 14 ⊕ ∆Z 15 = 0 (∆Z i meaning the difference on Z i ), which means that in f 2 , the variables X L and X H will contain no difference. The total probability of this characteristic is about 2 −3 . See Table 2 .
In f 2 , as mentioned, the desired bit differences in Z yield no difference in X L and X H . Hence, in the output words H * 0 , H * 1 , H * 3 , H * 4 , there are only differences in the MSBs, and these come from the message M . There is no difference in H * 2 . In H * 5 , the MSB difference in Z 13 is inherited, and there are no other differences. In H * 6 , the difference 0100 . . . 0 in Z 14 is inherited and with probability 1/2 does not propagate. In H * 7 , the MSB difference in M 7 cancels the MSB difference in Z 15 , and the resulting difference is 0100 . . . 0, which does not propagate with probability 1/2.
In H * 8 , the difference coming from H * 4 is rotated and does not propagate with probability 1/2. When it does not propagate, the difference is 0 . . . 0100000000. In H * 9 , differences come from H * 5 and M 9 . The MSB difference in H * 5 is rotated by 10 positions to yield 0 . . . 01000000000. With probability 1/2, it does not propagate. The MSB difference from M 9 is inherited. In H * 10 , the difference from H * 6 is rotated by 11 positions to yield 0 . . . 01000000000 with probability 1/2. In H * 11 , the difference from H * 7 is rotated by 12 positions to yield 0 . . . 010000000000 with probability 1/2. In H * 12 , the MSB difference from H * 0 is rotated by 13 positions to yield 0 . . . 01000000000000 with probability 1/2. In H * 13 , there are differences in three input words: H * 1 , Z 13 , and M 13 . However, the MSB differences in Z 13 and M 13 cancel each other out, and the MSB difference in H * 1 yields 0 . . . 010000000000000 with probability 1/2. In H 14 , the difference 0100 . . . 0 from Z 14 is inherited with probability 1/2, and this is the only input difference. Finally, in H * 15 there are differences coming from H * 3 and Z 15 ; these yield 0100 . . . 01000000000000000 with total probability 1/4.
To sum up, there are one-bit differences in H * 0 , H * 1 , H * 3 , . . . , H * 8 , H * 10 , . . . , H * 14 , and two-bit differences in H * 9 and H * 15 (see Table 3 ). The total number of bit differences is 17, and the total probability of this near-collision is about 2 −14 (assuming independence). 10 of the differences are in the words H * 8 , . . . , H * 15 , which are the output words of the BMW-256 and BMW-512 hash functions (after truncation). 9 differences are in the words H * 9 , . . . , H * 15 , which are the output words of the BMW-224 hash function. 7 differences are in the words H * 10 , . . . , H * 15 , which are the output words of the BMW-384 hash function. 
Other Difference Patterns
We note that the difference in Z may be slightly different, and still give the same results as those described. For instance, the difference patterns of Z 14 and Z 15 may be swapped. Moreover, there are in fact slightly better message difference patterns than the one described above. As an example, a difference in the MSB of W 13 and in the secondmost significant bit of W 15 yields-with a high probability-a near-collision in all but 14 bits of the compression function output (9 of these are in the last eight words). However, the corresponding message difference in M has a higher Hamming weight, and specifically there are differences in the words M 14 and M 15 , which (in a pseudo-attack on the hash function) are reserved for padding. We did not find simple difference patterns with differences only in the last few words of W that lead to full collisions with high probability.
With a value of the security parameter above 13, the above characteristic has a low (if not zero) probability. However, even with a value of 16, a high probability characteristic exists producing near-collisions of total Hamming weight as low as 24 for the 16 output words of the compression function (see [6] ).
A Pseudo-near-collision in BMW-256
In the attack described above, there are no differences in M 14 and M 15 , which in BMW-256 are the words containing length padding. This means we can extend the nearcollision attack on the compression function to a pseudo-near-collision attack on the BMW-256 hash function. Moreover, one of the colliding messages may start from the correct initial value of BMW-256; the other initial value will be different from the correct one in the same 7 bit positions as those which contain differences in M .
As an example, the bit sequence of length 447 bits starting with the three bytes f3 8b 01 and ending with (423) '0'-bits follows the characteristic described above (with chaining input equal to the BMW-256 initial value). The 256-bit output of the hash function is 7927dc5d5759cdd85bdd3e8276e41dd5fd627bff0f3813f51238db090a5e433d.
When applying the difference pattern described above to both the message and the initial value of BMW-256, the hash function output is 7926dc5d575bcd585bdf3e8276e01dd5fd727bff0f1813f51238db490ade437d.
The XOR of the two outputs is 0001000000020080000200000004000000100000002000000000004000800040.
Pseudo-attacks
A second observation on the BMW compression function leads to improved pseudocollision, -preimage, and -second preimage attacks: if Z i = 0 for all i, 0 ≤ i < 16, then we get the following greatly simplified description of f 2 .
Controlling Output Words -A First Example
Some output words of the compression function can be controlled by an attacker after fixing Z = 0. The idea is to fix some words of M and some words of Y in such a way that a number of output words obtain an arbitrary value chosen by the attacker, and such that f 1 can be computed backwards, i.e., computing Y 15 from Z, then Y 14 , etc. Words of M can be fixed directly, since they are part of the input to the compression function. Words of Y can be fixed indirectly via words of W , which, as mentioned, depend on M . There is enough freedom to fix some words of M and some words of W at the same time. More details follow. Note that this attack is independent of the value of the security parameter, since both simple and complex rounds are invertible.
Consider as an example the "new" definition of H * 11 :
By fixing M 7 , Y 7 , M 11 , and Y 11 , one has effectively controlled H * 11 . Message words are part of the input to the compression function. Words of Y can be controlled to some extent via words of W ; after having fixed Z, we are able to compute words of Y in the backward direction, i.e., we compute Y 15 first, then Y 14 etc., all the way down to Y 0 . Alternatively, we can compute the value of W i needed to get some desired value of Y i , for any i such that Y j is already computed for all j > i. Thereby, we indirectly control
As a simple example for BMW-256, assume we want H * 11 to obtain the value α. To do this, we may choose (e.g.) M 7 = Y 7 = Y 11 = 0 and M 11 = α. We obtain Y 7 = Y 11 = 0 by controlling W 7 and W 11 . Note that once Y and M are fixed, we compute H as described in Section 2.1. How to control words of M and words of W at the same time is now described.
Sticking to the example, assume we want to be able to control M 7 , M 11 , W 7 , and W 11 . Compute W = B · M with (initially) all words of M as free parameters. 
. . .
By computing the words Y i in the backward direction, or choosing Y i and computing the required W i for i from 15 down to 7, we can control all the words Y 15 , Y 14 , . . . , Y 7 . In particular, we can make sure that Y 7 = Y 11 = 0. Since M 7 and M 11 are free, we can also choose these two message words as we want; in particular, we can choose M 7 = 0 and M 11 = α, so that we obtain H * 11 = α. Since we indirectly also control H * 7 , we can obtain H * 7 = β for any β of our choice via a proper choice of, say, M 7 . Note that in order to compute Y 1 and Y 0 , s 1 must be inverted (see Section 2.1.1). This is slightly more complicated in practise than computing s 1 in the forward direction, but it can also be done efficiently (with some additional memory requirements) by precomputing and storing all inverses.
The reason for choosing to control H * 11 is that Y 7 is involved in its computation. This means we have to make only a few words of W free (W 15 down to W 7 ), and there is still a large amount of freedom in the choice of a number of words of M . This will be useful in extensions of the attack.
Controlling Additional Output Words
There are many degrees of freedom left. These can be used to control additional output words. For instance, we may control H * 6 and H * 10 via M 6 , W 6 , M 10 , and W 10 . We again keep M 14 and M 15 free as above, but M 13 is not free. We shall obtain correct "10. . . " padding in M 13 probabilistically; the probability is about 1/2 if we assume only a single bit of "10. . . " padding (hence, the message length is 512 − 65 = 447 bits). We set M 6 = M 7 = M 10 = M 11 = 0 (for the sake of simplicity), and now we want to free all W i for i from 15 down to 6, since we need to be able to control Y 6 . Using the same method as in the previous examples, we obtain the vector
We now control the four output words H * 6 , H * 7 , H * 10 , and H * 11 via W 6 , W 7 , W 10 , and W 11 . The time complexity of this attack is about 2, since we need correct "10. . . " padding in M 13 , but we have no (direct) control over this message word.
Other Variants of BMW
The same technique as described above for BMW-256 can be applied to BMW-512. In fact, for BMW-512, length padding takes up only one message word, and therefore we have enough freedom to ensure correct "10. . . " padding with probability 1.
Obviously, the attacks also apply to BMW-224 and BMW-384, since these differ from BMW-256 and BMW-512 (respectively) only in the initial value and the final truncation.
Applications
After truncation, two out of eight (or out of six or seven in the case of BMW-384 and BMW-224, respectively) output words can be given any value chosen by the attacker. This control can be used to carry out pseudo-attacks, i.e., attacks in which the attacker is free to choose the initial value of the hash function. Example pseudo-attacks are pseudocollision, pseudo-preimage, and pseudo-second preimage attacks. The time complexities of these attacks on BMW correspond to brute force attacks on 3/4 of the output bits (or 2/3 or 5/7 in the case of BMW-384 and BMW-224, respectively). Hence, the time complexity is reduced compared to an ideal hash function. Table 5 summarises the attack complexities for the three types of attack on the four variants of Blue Midnight Wish. Memory requirements are negligible.
As mentioned, pseudo-attacks are attacks in which the attacker is free to choose the initial value of the hash function. In the case of pseudo-collision and pseudo-second preimage attacks, the two colliding messages will generally assume two different initial values.
Available Degrees of Freedom
Clearly, in these attacks we do not have to choose Z to be all-zero, we can choose it to be anything we want. Also, we have lots of freedom in the choice of M 6 , M 7 , M 10 , . The choices we made in the examples above were only to simplify expressions. The available degrees of freedom may be useful in extensions of the attacks; however, so far we did not succeed in doing this.
Some Examples
As a proof of concept, we now give some examples where output words H * 6 , H * 7 , H * 10 , and H * 11 are controlled (set to zeros). All words are written in (little endian) hexadecimal.
BMW-256.
With chaining input H = (ca9f6a93, 3cf76d1d, 9e4dc0d0, c3c23fdc, a9dbaa8d, fc21aac3, 9b4025d4, 9cc22fd7, 61d87164, 798a37d0, 600c7d3d, 34e25b56, ed8daa32, 6cf3fb69, 30fab149, dc9bd4c2) and message input (including padding) M = (0803a93a, 5013d06d, ebd8f1b6, ada77a2b, 41491ede, 3af1638e, 00000000, 00000000, 7445bdbc, 90eec654, 00000000, 00000000, 610b24e8, 11a24bca, 000001bf, 00000000), the output of the compression function is H * = (a321e2f8, ec7c4e0a, 47f45671, 2009f6ed, 964a5ce7, 5c4fce1d, 00000000, 00000000, 2d7273b0, 928f72bc, 00000000, 00000000, 6ca15abe, 3fa46015, b16696b4, f6ad9f5c).
Hence, if H as defined above had been the initial value of BMW-256, then the message M would hash to b073722dbc728f920000000000000000be5aa16c1560a43fb49666b15c9fadf6.
Finding this chaining/message pair required the equivalent of two compression function calls.
BMW-512.
An example for BMW-512 is the following. With chaining input H = (ff95021298b8053b, bcc99f334f6e20af, 7387085dbb945b21, a6e3e0c15e1518d3, ac1269c4776c3dce, 862544c1ccc9b56e, ba4d394db6052685, fd9cbbf7da10c97c, d5fb04f37d785c9d, 5369199dce565dd4, 7bdc4c99a89666a9, 5c856b804801cf84, a9d3c3347f1e1021, 7cb27b3b516d1642, 2b80503146c44e2b, 130d06d4893028ba) and message input (including padding) M = (1462e93afb35c1cc, da9f0d9ea7f0d9ec, 57b861f574387fb3, d8db2240ca1fddca, 0b2aee5199e34ed8, 00d79aaa54b1b95e, 0000000000000000, 0000000000000000, 2de5cb945577564d, cc627a486df4b73d, 0000000000000000, 0000000000000000, a4791f4f65cd3bf3, 63cfeaaf0067f03c, 0100000000000000, 00000000000003bf), the output of the compression function is H * = (88e74c537efd26d4, 1ac48d4de6bc9df7, dbc7bd6d95876c96, 593ce88619782657, ff01649945976d60, 6df14428399268cd, 0000000000000000, 0000000000000000, f63e5fc6672c86f8, 100b2869c2be6b8f, 0000000000000000, 0000000000000000, e63005f1f87f3560, af255aa7c7e0f16c, a7652904d6f61a35, b7dadc75cabe3b7b).
Hence, if the initial value of BMW-512 would be equal to the chaining variable above, then the 512-bit message digest would be f8862c67c65f3ef68f6bbec269280b1000000000000000000000000000000000 60357ff8f10530e66cf1e0c7a75a25af351af6d6042965a77b3bbeca75dcdab7.
Finding this chaining/message pair required the equivalent of one compression function call.
Conclusion
We have described a number of weaknesses in the Blue Midnight Wish hash function. The weaknesses lead to attacks in which the adversary is allowed to choose the initial value of the hash function. It is by no means straightforward to extend the attacks to full-blown attacks using the given initial values of the BMW variants. Meet-in-themiddle attacks also do not seem possible since BMW uses an internal state that is at least twice as large as the output of the hash function.
The attacks apparently do not apply to the tweaked version of BMW.
A Details of P P is a permutation that corresponds to first multiplying the input by a matrix C, and then applying reasonably simple permutations to each word. The matrix C is defined in the same way for all variants of BMW. We have 
Note that C is invertible modulo 2 32 and modulo 2 64 , but we omit a specification of the inverses.
As an example, if the input is the vector X, and T = C · X, then (e.g.) T 0 = X 5 − X 7 + X 10 + X 13 + X 14 mod 2 w . The output Y = P (X) is computed as Y i ← s i mod 5 (T i ) for 0 ≤ i < 16, where the permutations s i , 0 ≤ i ≤ 4, are defined in Appendix B.
B Sub-functions used in P and f 1 The sub-functions s i , 0 ≤ i ≤ 4, and r i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 7, used in P and in f 1 are defined as follows.
BMW-224 and BMW-256
BMW-384 and BMW-512 s 0 (x) = x 1 ⊕ x 3 ⊕ x ≪4 ⊕ x ≪19 s 0 (x) = x 1 ⊕ x 3 ⊕ x ≪4 ⊕ x ≪37 s 1 (x) = x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ x ≪8 ⊕ x ≪23 s 1 (x) = x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ x ≪13 ⊕ x ≪43 s 2 (x) = x 2 ⊕ x 1 ⊕ x ≪12 ⊕ x ≪25 s 2 (x) = x 2 ⊕ x 1 ⊕ x ≪19 ⊕ x ≪53 s 3 (x) = x 2 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ x ≪15 ⊕ x ≪29 s 3 (x) = x 2 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ x ≪28 ⊕ x ≪59 s 4 (x) = x 1 ⊕ x s 4 (x) = x 1 ⊕ x s 5 (x) = x 2 ⊕ x s 5 (x) = x 2 ⊕ x r 1 (x) = x ≪3 r 1 (x) = x ≪5 r 2 (x) = x ≪7 r 2 (x) = x ≪11 r 3 (x) = x ≪13 r 3 (x) = x ≪27 r 4 (x) = x ≪16 r 4 (x) = x ≪32 r 5 (x) = x ≪19 r 5 (x) = x ≪37 r 6 (x) = x ≪23 r 6 (x) = x ≪43 r 7 (x) = x ≪27 r 7 (x) = x ≪53 C Inverses of the matrix B used in f 1
The matrix B introduced in Section 2.1.1 is defined as 
It is circulant, meaning that each row is equal to the row above rotated one position to the right. The inverses modulo 2 32 and 2 64 are also circulant. The first row of
